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Second Special Report 
1. The Committee published its Third Report of Session 2004–05 (UK e-University)1 on 3 
March 2005. The Government’s response was received on 20 July 2005, and is published as 
Appendix 1 to this Report. 
 
Appendix 1 
Government’s response to the Third Report from the Education and Skills Committee, 
Session 2004–05. 
The Committee’s conclusions and recommendations are in bold text. The Government’s 
response is in plain text. 
1. We thank the Committee for their report on the UK eUniversity.  There were 
considerable hopes for this initiative and we acknowledge that the outcome has been highly 
disappointing.  Whilst some of the factors that led to the failure of the venture were specific 
to time and place we recognise that there are also issues which have more generalised 
application.  Both the Department and the Higher Education Council for England 
(HEFCE) have separately undertaken their own assessments of the lessons to be learned 
(HEFCE’s can be found at http://www.hefce.ac.uk/learning/tinits/euniv; the Department’s 
is currently in draft) and have begun the process of implementing changes as a result.  The 
Committee’s report has played a very valuable part in these processes. 
2. We have not commented on the Committee’s Recommendation 1 (“that the way in 
which decisions to televise select committee meetings are made is reviewed with a view to 
giving Committees a more active role in the process”).  This is not a matter for 
Government but for the House authorities and the broadcasting organisations.   
3. This response deals with the Committee’s remaining recommendations under 
three broad headings: 
a. issues around the general operation of the venture (covering 
recommendations 2-11, 13, 14, 24-26); 
b. accountability issues (primarily recommendations 12, 15-23); 
i) relating to UKeU structure; 
ii) relating to HEFCE; 
iii) relating to DfES; 
c. the way ahead on e-learning (recommendations 27-32). 
 
1 Third Report from the Education and Skills Committee, Session 2004–05, UK e-University, HC 205. 
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A.  Issues Around the General Operation of the Venture 
(Recommendations 2-11, 13, 14, 24-26) 
2. The UKeU failed to meet its targets, aims, and objectives. The launch of the first 
UKeU courses was delayed until September 2003. When launched, they attracted 
just 900 students against a target of 5,600. Furthermore, despite it being a condition 
of grant, UKeU failed to attract significant private investment. (Paragraph 23) 
3. At the very heart of the failure of UKeU was that systems and structures that may 
have been considered appropriate when set against the original plan became 
inappropriate for a venture that was almost entirely publicly funded. (Paragraph 
32) 
4. We consider that for either the private sector or the public sector the bonuses 
paid to senior staff were wholly unacceptable and morally indefensible. The 
argument that they reflect private sector practice does not stand up to scrutiny. Any 
company which paid bonuses of the kind having underperformed in the way that 
UKeU did would face severe criticism from its shareholders. The non-executive 
directors who approved these bonuses through the Remuneration Committee 
cannot escape criticism. (Paragraph 33) 
5. We are also unable to accept the view of the Chairman and Chief Executive that 
they were involved in a risk business which made such bonuses appropriate. The 
company was involved in a new and relatively untried sector, but it carried no 
market risk. It was backed with £50 million of public money; the risk was to that 
public investment, not to the company. (Paragraph 34) 
6. Our findings are that UKeU failed largely because it took a supply-driven, rather 
than demand-led approach. (Paragraph 35) 
7. A supply-driven approach, combined with the very ambitious nature of the 
venture in an emerging market that did not sustain the high expectations of 
demand, and an inability to work in effective partnership with the private sector, 
led to the failure of UKeU to meet its targets, aims, and objectives. (Paragraph 36) 
8. We have found that UKeU inherited a narrowly focussed definition of e-learning 
and chose to pursue that approach without questioning it at any stage. It did not 
focus on research and development concerning the definition of e-learning, and it 
did not have a ‘learner-centred’ approach. (Paragraph 43) 
11. UKeU allowed the development of the technology platform to drive its strategy 
and the development of programmes. It had a skewed focus on the platform, based 
on an assumption that once this was right, the original projections of very high 
student numbers would be easy to realise. Unfortunately this assumption was not 
based on research evidence, but on an over-confident presumption about the scale 
of the demand for wholly internet based e-learning. (Paragraph 60) 
13. It appears to us that the wave of enthusiasm which caused all but a handful of 
higher education institutions to sign up to the UKeU project receded very rapidly, 
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leaving it without private sector investment or active higher education sector 
engagement. (Paragraph 65) 
14. We have found that, although there were ambitious aims for the project before 
UKeU was established, it added to the pressure by taking very ambitious business 
decisions. (Paragraph 67) 
24. The problem for UKeU was a combination of the ambitious nature of the 
original idea, and an over-confidence about the level of demand for e-learning 
which led to an approach which was insufficiently focussed on research and 
marketing and which was not learner-centred. To be successful, the project’s main 
focus should have been on clearly identifying its market and knowing the demands 
of its customers. (Paragraph 108) 
25. The lesson to be learnt is that such high-risk ventures entering new and 
emerging markets must have a focus on front-line research. They need to have the 
flexibility to adapt to changing market trends, and directors/managers must be able 
to make strategic and operational decisions, but these decisions must be evidence-
based and rooted in robust and reliable research information. (Paragraph 109) 
4. The Committee examined in some detail the business performance of UK 
eUniversities Worldwide Ltd (UKeU).  It has provided a very cogent analysis of value to 
the Government, HEFCE and all others considering future e-learning initiatives in the 
HE sector. 
5. As the report notes, the running of the UKeU business was a matter for its 
Board and senior management and not for the Government or for HEFCE.  We would 
simply comment that UKeU conducted its operations in a very fast-moving market 
situation.  Private sector enthusiasm for ‘dotcoms’ changed very dramatically over the 
period from the announcement of the eUniversity project in 2000 to the launch of the 
venture in 2003.  Similarly, eLearning has taken a different course than the venture 
anticipated, with greater focus on eLearning blended with elements of campus-based or 
distance learning, rather than wholly Internet-based learning.  Uses of the Internet in 
commercial ventures have perplexed many experienced companies.  We note that 
different views are emerging in the continuing debate on critical eUniversity issues - 
which is not unexpected given the complex market conditions (see, for example, the 
breaking news article of 6 March 2005 from the Borderless Education Observatory set 
up by Universities UK, The last chapter? UK Select Committee publishes final report on 
UK eUniversity http://www.obhe.ac.uk/news/March2005.html ). 
9. It is inexplicable to us that UKeU did not seek to forge a partnership with the 
British Council to help it to understand the markets that it was trying to enter and 
to develop strategies for selling its products in them. (Paragraph 52) 
10. Evidence to this inquiry suggests that UKeU’s understanding of their markets 
came from anecdotal evidence from individual discussions rather than from 
systematic analysis. There was no formal market research undertaken to assess 
either the level of demand or the nature of the demand and the type of e-learning 
required. There was no systematic evaluation of the markets, no thorough and 
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robust market research, and no understanding of consumer demand. This was 
typical of UKeU’s supply-driven rather than demand-led approach. (Paragraph 55) 
6. We note the Committee’s observations on UKeU’s approach to marketing.  The 
whole area of marketing was a major focus in HEFCE’s formal review of the venture.  
At the outset of the venture HEFCE commissioned research to identify potential 
markets (‘A Study on Market Issues for the Proposed e-University’, Commonwealth 
Higher Education Management Service (CHEMS), June 2000).  Later PwC also 
commissioned further research on markets to inform their business model.  However, 
overall more could certainly have been done. 
The Government’s approach to risk 
26. We do not want the Government to become increasingly risk-averse as a result 
of the UKeU experience. Instead it should learn from this experience and, in the 
future, take a more experimental approach to such risk ventures. This would 
involve focussing more on testing various models and prototypes; taking an 
evidence-based approach; involving the private sector as partners in a more organic 
process; undertaking effective risk-assessment procedures; and setting open and 
transparent success criteria for such projects. (Paragraph 112) 
7. We welcome the Committee’s view in the report that the public sector should 
not shrink from high risk projects.  We concur with the Committee that the use of 
models and proto-types is very valuable particularly in high risk areas and note that a 
number of models were explored by HEFCE in setting up the eUniversity project.  In 
the case of the eUniversity, the perceived imperative of early entry into the market 
limited the length of time for prototyping. 
B.  Accountability Issues (Recommendations 12, 15-23) 
(i) Relating to UKeU structure 
12. UKeU’s attempt to form genuine partnerships with the private sector, though 
unsuccessful, was commendable and could have helped UKeU to stay competitive 
and market-orientated. Instead, UKeU became another example of how difficult 
the public sector finds it to form successful partnerships with the private sector. 
The failure to find private sector partners or investors should, however, have 
caused the holding company, HEFCE and the DfES to have concerns sooner rather 
than later about the viability of the project. (Paragraph 63) 
15. With no private investors, the sole reliance on public money, and with no direct 
accountability for the expenditure of that public money, UKeU had a very high 
degree of freedom. It could be argued that this was necessary in such a high-risk 
venture, but it should have been more accountable either through controls 
appropriate for a public sector organisation or through carrying some risk as a 
private company. (Paragraph 79) 
16. An important lesson to be learnt is that senior management should have had 
either very clear accountability for the expenditure of public money, or risk from 
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market pressures to succeed through private investment in the project. A high risk 
venture such as this does not necessitate a high risk approach to structure and 
accountability. Where there is a significant distance created between the 
accounting officer and the decisions taken by the senior management of the 
operating company, there needs to be either clear lines of accountability or some 
market risk. (Paragraph 82) 
17. Our inquiry has found that HoldCo became the primary accountability agent, 
but this was not the original intention.  As a result, HoldCo only had the formal 
structures in place for it to perform a very limited monitoring role where this role 
needed to be much more significant.  With no private investment, the structure 
needed to change to develop the role and capacity of the HoldCo to hold UKeU to 
account. (Paragraph 88) 
8. UKeU was intended to operate in the private sector with commercial-type speed 
and flexibility to address a new learning market.  However, as it was to be jointly 
funded by public and private investment in equal shares, there was an accountability 
structure and framework intended to protect public funds. 
9. The Department provided a significant - but finite - sum to HEFCE for the 
venture, with guidance on the high level objectives to be pursued.  HEFCE provided 
funds under a legal Deed and conditions of grant to the Holding Company.  The 
conditions of grant required the Holding Company to invest funds only against a 
robust business proposition and with private matched funding.  Terms also required 
the Holding Company to meet best practice in governance as set out in The Combined 
Code (Principles of Good Governance and Code of Best Practice) published by the 
Financial Services Authority, May 2000, including specifically requiring an audit 
committee.  The Holding Company was required to report at least annually, and also 
exceptionally as necessary, on the value for money achieved from the grant and on the 
assurance of quality in the venture.  The Holding Company was also required to place 
similar governance requirements on UKeU.  
10. The Holding Company attracted a Board of senior figures from the HE sector 
(appointed in the main by the representative bodies for HE – Universities UK and the 
Standing Conference of Principals – and not by HEFCE, as the Committee’s report 
states.  Only a minority were appointed by HEFCE, in discussion with the other UK HE 
funding bodies).  A Board of senior HE and commercial figures also directed UKeU, 
supported by an experienced senior management team. 
11. Given the conditions under which the venture was intended to operate, at the 
time DfES and HEFCE were reasonably confident that the structures in place and the 
personnel engaged should have provided adequate protection for public funds.  We 
cannot say whether that confidence would have been justified if the venture had 
operated as planned.  Certainly, if such a situation occurred again, we would reconsider 
whether HEFCE should have been given a rather more formal role in setting the 
strategic direction of the business. 
12. However, those conditions changed in spring 2002 when it finally became clear 
that matching private investment would not be forthcoming for some time.  With 
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hindsight we can now see that the UKeU structures should then have been reviewed 
more thoroughly.  Some changes were made, at HEFCE’s instigation, to the conditions 
of grant, including a variation to  UkeU’s Articles of Association to alter the 50:50 
balance of powers between the public and private sector by giving a right of veto to the 
public sector directors.  But a more thorough review at this point would have been 
appropriate, to allow more detailed scrutiny of the intentions of the new UKeU board 
and senior management on business strategy and company set up.  Such a review might 
also have raised questions about the issues of remuneration and the bonus scheme 
which the Committee has criticised in its report (Recommendations 3-5).  Whilst we 
might have expected either UKeU or the Holding Company to have raised structures as 
an issue in spring 2002, in the absence of action on their part either HEFCE or the 
Department, through their monitoring of the project, should have intervened.  All 
therefore share some measure of blame here. 
(ii) HEFCE accountability issues 
19. A key lesson to be learnt is that, in high risk ventures such as UKeU, a great deal 
more needs to be done to support the accounting officer to enable him to act 
effectively in his role. The accounting officer must have at least equal expertise 
available to him as is available to the company in order to hold such an unusual 
public-private venture to account. The accounting officer in the public sector must 
have the backing of experts with a high reputation to assess such public-private 
ventures against agreed benchmarks and criteria for success. (Paragraph 98) 
20. A group of advisors to HEFCE including members of PwC who produced the 
original business plan, and experts from The Open University and British Council, 
for example, could have been put together to keep UKeU in much closer account in 
terms of the decisions they made. This would have enabled much closer 
accountability from the start of the project. (Paragraph 99) 
13. We agree it is vital for high quality advice to be available to an accounting 
officer.  It is necessary to be able to understand what a delivery agent is doing and to be 
able to mount effective and appropriate challenges where necessary, while avoiding 
duplication of effort.  In the case of UKeU, we do not think that lack of specialist 
expertise was a crucial factor.  HEFCE appointed and took advice from a steering 
group, which contained a range of expertise, during the set up of the project.  
Appropriate experts also supported HEFCE in the autumn 2003 review of the venture, 
and the subsequent wind-down of UKeU, and we understand from HEFCE that these 
worked very effectively.  Hence when expertise was sought, it was readily available.  We 
accept (paragraph 12 above) that there were missed opportunities for earlier reviews 
during the course of the project; had those reviews taken place, further expert support 
would have been provided to the HEFCE Accounting Officer. 
18. In the absence of risk from market pressures, the accounting officer needs to be 
able to make accountability reach down to the operational level. The Government 
will have to consider the implications of this conflict in the role of shadow director 
and accounting officer for any future projects. (Paragraph 92) 
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14. We understand these concerns.  The complex accountability structure of the 
venture was intended to make clear that neither HEFCE nor Government would 
control the business.  That caused tensions as it gradually became obvious that HEFCE 
funding was in fact the only significant source of income for the company, and that 
decisions by HEFCE’s accounting officer would be critical to its future.  Questions 
about avoiding shadow directorship roles then inevitably arose. 
15. In many ways the UKeU venture was a one-off in terms of seeking to establish a 
self-standing commercial company with public good elements.  We do not therefore 
expect this issue to arise again to the same extent.  If it did, we would put in different 
structures to circumvent as far as possible such dilemmas.  We are aware that Treasury 
is considering this kind of issue in respect of public private partnerships and we will 
discuss with them how the development of their thinking can take into account the 
circumstances of this case. 
16. We understand from HEFCE that scrutiny of the eUniversity project, as well as 
increased experience with other funded bodies, has helped it develop its risk 
management and related bodies procedures over the course of the project.  The Council 
now has in place an accountability framework that enables it to give secure and 
consistent treatment to related bodies (i.e. bodies other than higher education 
institutions (HEIs) which HEFCE fund to secure services to the HE sector), comparable 
to that for HEIs.  It is firmly committed to evidence-based approaches to the 
development of policies and projects, which is evidenced by the considerable corpus of 
material that it is releasing through the Higher Education Academy from the 
eUniversity project development (at http://www.heacademy.ac.uk/e-University.htm). 
(iii) DfES accountability issues 
21. We have heard no evidence to suggest that the DfES would have arranged 
structures differently if it had chosen to run the project directly. (Paragraph 102) 
22. The lessons for the Government on ensuring accountability are the same as 
those for HEFCE: in high risk ventures such as this, more needs to be done to 
support the accounting officer to enable him to act effectively in his role. The 
accounting officer must have equivalent expertise available to him in order to hold 
such a public-private venture to account. (Paragraph 104)  
23. The DfES must improve its working practices if it is to continue to work with 
the private sector. (Paragraph 104) 
17. The Department felt that it was not the body best placed to manage the 
eUniversity project and therefore delegated this to HEFCE.  We believe that this view 
was the right one; indeed, in the future the Department will increasingly eschew hands 
on delivery of new and existing ventures as it adopts the strategic leadership role 
described in Chapter Nine of the Five Year Strategy for Children and Learners 
(published in July 2004 as Cm 6272).  However the Department fully recognises the 
importance of taking steps, and developing its staff, to ensure that delivery partners 
operate effectively. 
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18. Since the Committee's hearings in 2002 on the failure of the Department's 
Individual Learning Accounts programme, the Department has continued building on 
the lessons learnt to develop financial, risk management and programme and project 
management skills across the Department, using professional specialist expertise where 
it is needed.  Over the two year period April 2003 to March 2005 around 1,050 
members of staff and 230 staff in its NDPBs have been trained in project and 
programme management (PPM) techniques.  In addition approximately 390 
individuals have obtained an accredited PPM qualification in the period. 
19. More recently the Department has developed and is currently implementing a 
Departmental Risk Improvement Plan to further enhance and foster a management 
culture which supports well thought-through risk taking and innovation.  This plan 
focuses on the areas where we need to raise our risk management capability including 
the effective management (not just identification and assessment) of risk; improving 
the management of risk with delivery partners; and improving the clarity of risk 
management strategy and policies.  The plan is backed up by a robust evaluation 
strategy which will allow us to monitor and review progress and its effectiveness, and 
provide us with evidence upon which to base decisions about future improvement 
actions. 
20. The Department’s own assessment of the lessons to be learned from the e-
university venture will inform continuing thinking on how best to position itself to 
ensure effective delivery of new and existing ventures by partners. 
C.  The way ahead on e-learning (recommendations 27-32) 
27. The Government, through HEFCE, must deliver on its commitment to outline 
its strategy, and action plan for its implementation, for embedding e-learning in 
HE in a full and sustainable way. (Paragraph 117) 
28. The Government, through HEFCE, should state as soon as possible how it 
intends to invest the residual £12 million funds remaining from the e-University 
project in order to meet its commitment ‘to embed e-learning in a full and 
sustainable way’ over the next 10 years. In doing so, it should keep in mind the 
importance of collaborative projects across the FE and HE sectors (Paragraph 126) 
30. We recommend that the Government, through HEFCE, ensures that thorough 
and robust market research is undertaken for use by the whole sector in order to 
maintain the UK interests in the global market for e-learning, keeping in mind the 
commercial sensitivity of such research, and the potential for collaborative projects 
between FE and HE sectors. (Paragraph 134) 
31. We recommend that the Government, through HEFCE, clarifies how it intends 
to invest in and support collaborative ventures in e-learning both across the HE 
sector, and between the FE and HE sector, in a way that provides equal opportunity 
and advantage to all those who would wish to be involved in the global market for 
e-learning. (Paragraph 142) 
32. Whilst recognising the important role the Government has to play in providing 
support, information and guidance for e-learning to develop within HEIs, we 
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conclude that the Government’s role in providing an overarching national strategy 
for e-learning is vital to ensure consistency, coherence, and clarity of purpose in 
developments across the sector. The Government, through HEFCE, must clarify its 
national strategy for developing e-learning in the UK and how it intends to invest 
in and support e-learning across the HE sector in a way that provides coherent 
progress. (Paragraph 144)  
21. There are two key documents especially relevant to the Committee’s 
recommendations around embedding e-learning in HE in a full and sustainable way.  
They have been developed with reference to each other.   
22. The first is our overall DfES e-strategy, Harnessing Technology: Transforming 
Learning and Children’s Services, published on 15 March 
(http://www.dfes.gov.uk/publications/e-strategy).  This is a cross-cutting strategy which 
sets out, for the first time, priorities for children’s services and all sectors of education.  
It escalates the Government’s commitment to use the enabling power of technology for 
the benefit of children and learners, securing social justice, equality of opportunity and 
economic success. 
23. The e-strategy identifies the need for action at two levels.  System-level actions 
will coordinate cross-sector work, and develop a common solution on behalf of all 
sectors where appropriate.  Such actions are designed to promote collaboration across 
sectors to enable universities, colleges and schools to work more closely together to 
meet the needs of individual students.  Sector-based actions will seek economies of scale 
through a collective framework in which partners and agencies in a particular sector 
(broken down into: schools; 14-19 and post-16; higher education; children’s services) 
share good practice and ensure the right solution for that sector.  All these actions have 
been allocated to identified partners, with deliverable goals and milestones, as outlined 
in the strategy document. The e-strategy will be taken forward in partnership with JISC 
and Becta, who will be responsible for coordinating delivery across all key partners in 
all sectors of education, skills and children’s services. 
24. The higher education section of the strategy makes explicit reference to the 
second key document, HEFCE’s e-learning strategy, published on 8 March.  The 
HEFCE strategy includes details of future investment in eLearning utilising the residual 
funds from the eUniversity project of some £12 million.  The HEFCE strategy will be 
taken forward in partnership between HEFCE, the HE Academy and JISC, and hence 
will link through JISC and HE Academy with work in the FE sector. 
25. The strategy builds upon the eUniversity programme to support the 
development of individual HEI eLearning missions and partnerships and also includes 
commitment to address the need for research into eLearning.  In particular, there is an 
action designed to fill the support gap left by the UKeU, expressed also as a milestone in 
the Department’s e-strategy in the following terms: 
“Provide common collaborative development support for institutions offering 
remote e-learning opportunities – to be available eventually to all institutions, 
beginning with a joint HEA/JISC e-Learning Advisory Service set up within the 
national e-learning advice centre for 2006”. 
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26. The value of the eUniversity to HE has also been preserved and maintained 
through transfer of individual eLearning programmes from UKeU to the individual 
HEIs concerned: the eChina programme has been moved to Cambridge University; the 
eLearning research Centre (eLRC) is now based in the Higher Education Academy and 
the universities of Manchester and Southampton.  We believe the eLRC and the 
Academy will play a very useful part in examining and disseminating experience from 
the eUniversity and assisting with the implementation of the HE eLearning strategy. 
29. £14.5 million of public funds was invested in the development of the UKeU 
technology platform. At present it is not clear how much of this investment can be 
recovered, or to what use the platform can be put. Whilst it is too early to 
determine the future value of the platform, it is important that the returns should 
be maximised and that they should be invested back into e-learning. (Paragraph 
131)  
27. UkeU’s Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) in the platform have been secured 
jointly by HEFCE and Sun Microsystems.  This  acquisition will enable the UK HE 
sector to use these IPRs through a sub-licensing arrangement, and also for the public 
purse to secure appropriate return on commercial exploitation through Sun. 
 
Department for Education and Skills 
20 July 2005 
